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Abstract
A purely inter-model version of a machine intelligence benchmark
would allow us to measure intelligence directly as information without pro-
jecting that information onto labeled datasets. We propose a framework in
which other learners measure the informational significance of their peers
across a network and use a digital ledger to negotiate the scores. However,
the main benefits of measuring intelligence with other learners are lost if
the underlying scores are dishonest. As a solution, we show how competi-
tion for connectivity in the network can be used to force honest bidding.
We first prove that selecting inter-model scores using gradient descent is
a regret-free strategy: one which generates the best subjective outcome
regardless of the behavior of others. We then empirically show that when
nodes apply this strategy, the network converges to a ranking that cor-
relates with the one found in a fully coordinated and centralized setting.
The result is a fair mechanism for training an internet-wide, decentralized
and incentivized machine learning system. Such a system produces – on
an ongoing basis – a continually hardening and expanding benchmark at
the generalized intersection of the participants.
1 Introduction
Almost exclusively, best-in-class machine learning systems require knowledge
previously extracted from datasets: representations of inputs which are seman-
tic, dis-joint, causal, and general enough to tackle a wide variety of problems
[1, 2]. The production of this form of intelligence globally, however, still relies on
a feedback mechanism which benchmarks it against specific tasks, rather than in
knowledge directly [3]. Since the mechanism is misaligned to the salient feature
being produced, a large portion of work is lost. Niche intelligence systems are
not really possible for instance, since they would need to improve the tasks in
totality before they were valued. Indeed, all work that it is not currently state-
of-the-art is pruned this way. The low-resolution is further compounded by its
lack of breadth: the narrowness of the domain described by the tasks make it
easier for models to buy progress without improved general-understanding [4].
Nor can we measure how much one team’s model could improve another. This
ensures the field is inherently non-collaborative, with the majority of researchers
world-wide in essence pitted against each other [5]. Ultimately, the only users
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capable of creating the systems with high performance are those with the means
and resources to train the largest models.
The aim in this paper is to show how a collective of intelligence systems
could be used to evaluate their peers. Crucially, the measure of intelligence is
with respect to intelligence itself, in information-theoretic terms, rather than
via a projection onto labeled datasets. Moreover, models share knowledge with
each other and it can compound in the system without needing to be relearned
by every new model. In essence the benchmark is an intelligence market which
rewards models who improve knowledge within it.1 We design the benchmark
to run in a continuous, asynchronous fashion, peer-to-peer (p2p) fashion across
the internet. Any number of supervised or unsupervised tasks, engineers, or
connected computers can be added concurrently. Since this introduces trust-
less computation 2, we also dedicate a part of this paper to explaining how the
system remains fair when little assurance can be given about the computers
which compose it.
2 Method
2.1 Benchmark
The network is composed by n unique parameterized functions F = f0, ..., fj , ...fn
where each function is producing an output tensor fi(F (x)), a ’representation’
from an input tensor F (x) = [f0(x)...fn(x)] gathered by querying its neighbors.
Each function is training asynchronously over a dataset Di = [X,Y ] such that,
given an error function Qi, its expectation over that data EDi defines a loss
Li = EDi[Qi( y, fi(F (x)) )]. We assume these losses are measured on the same
scale and thus our benchmark B can be defined by their sum:
B =
n∑
i
Li (1)
1“The iron rule of nature is: you get what you reward for. If you want ants to come, you
put sugar on the floor.” - Charlie Munger
2 In decentralized systems, trust is shifted from the individuals to the network itself,
”trustless” usually means ”minimal trust is required” w.r.t the protocol
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f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
L0 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5
D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
Figure 1: n=5 parameterized functions with losses Li and datasets Di.
Each parameterized function is represented here in its most abstract sense[6]
and need only accept the same input type x and produce the same output
dimension to fit within the network. For instance, unicode encoded strings x,
and responses: their semantic representations within some standard dimension.
This widened scope ensures participants can be multi-task [7], use completely
distinct computing substrates [8] or train on unique datasets. [9].
2.2 Ideal Ranking
Our goal in this work is to produce a ranking R = [Ri] over these functions where
the score Ri ∈ R represents participant i’s information-theoretic significance to
the benchmark B. Following Le Cun and others [10, 11], it is reasonable to
analytically define this significance by equating it with the cost of removing
each component from the network:
Ri ≈ 1
n
n∑
j
∑
x∈Dj
∆FT (x)i ∗H(Qj(x)) ∗∆F (x)i (2)
∆F (x)i = [0, ...0,−fi(x), 0, ...0]
Where the above is derived using a Taylor series (Appendix 6.1) and ∆F (x)i
is the perturbation of the inputs when removing function fi at the point x.
Note, the linear and higher order terms of the Taylor series have been removed
following [11] and the remaining term H(Qi) is the hessian of our error function.
When the error function Q is the twice-differentiable cross-entropy, then H(Qi)
is the Fisher information matrix, and Ri ∈ R is measured as relative entropy:
reflects each participants informational significance to the network as a whole.
2.3 Inter Ranking
It is not possible to compute the ranking score above without access to the
parameters of each function in the network. Instead, we use a set of inter-model
weights W = [wij ] where each wi,j is the score attributed to fj from fi combined
into an n× n square matrix.
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wij =
∑
x∈Di
∆FT (x)j ∗H(Qi(x)) ∗∆F (x)j (3)
f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
w0,0 w1,1 w2,2 w3,3 w4,4 w5,5
w0,5, w5,0
Figure 2: Inter-model contribution weights: wi,j the score attributed to fj from
fi
The weights can be computed on the fly either approximately [11], or by
using the full hessian of the error. We store them on a distributed ledger and
allow participants to update them by making changes of bounded size: W t+1 =
W t + λ∆W , where ||Wi||2 <  at block step t. We also enforce that the scores
in each row sum to 1, ||w||1 = 1. The equivalent ranking R (2) can then be
computed by normalizing column sum of the weight matrix:
R =
1
n
WT ∗ 1 (4)
The problem is of course is that without system-wide access to the model
parameters the computation of wij (3) is non-auditable. It is reasonable to as-
sume participants will select weights which artificially increase their own rank
rather than others in the network. Moreover, since the network remains open,
participants may choose to create many spuriously neighbours and rank them-
selves higher. The remainder of this paper describes our proposal for resolving
these issues.
2.4 Stake
The proposed solution begins by introducing a finite resource S = [si], a com-
ponent’s ’stake’ in the system, and an inflation mechanism τ which translates
the ranking vector R into additional stake as incentive.
R =
1
n
WT ◦ S ∗ 1 (5)
St+1 = St + τ ∗ R||R||2 (6)
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The ◦ here is the Hadamard product between the n× n matrix W and the
n× n matrix containing S in each column, and t is the time-step referred to in
Section 2.3 (measured in distinct blocks on the distributed ledger). By design (5)
increases the importance of those with stake, s0 ∗wij . This serves two purposes:
(1) since it is finite, new computers cannot spuriously create nodes to game the
ranking, and (2) the resource provides mechanism power. By providing it to
nodes with large rank, this ensures that those with weight must have worked
to attain it, or indirectly subsidized those who have done so already. A single
staked token would be enough to bootstrap the process. 3
Algorithm 1 Inflation mechanism
Require: S = [n× 1] Stake Vector
Require: W = [n× n] Weight Matrix
Require: τ > 0 inflation rate
while TRUE do
W = W + λ∆W
R = 1nW
T ◦ S ∗ 1
S = S + τ ∗ R||R||2
end while
2.5 Competitive weights
While stake provides some protection against malicious actors, it does not ensure
weights are set accurately. Our solution begins by introducing competition
for connectivity within the network. Nodes that underweight are punished by
having inputs from the network masked to zero (7). To frame this market we
borrow the continuous differential activation function σ with range (0, 1). Under
a choice of weights Wi the inputs to component i are:
FW (x) = [f0(x) ∗ σ(si ∗ wi,0 − µ0), ..., fn(x) ∗ σ(si ∗ wi,n − µn)] (7)
σ =
1
1 + e−
x
T
(8)
Here, the shift term µj is the average of the weights in each column µj =
( 1n )
∑n
i si ∗ wi,j , and the activation function is the temperature scaled sigmoid.
Because the allocation mechanism is standard across the network it is possible
for each participants to compute both ∂Li∂Wi and
∂Ri
∂Wi
. Computers may augment
their usual training framework, for instance, Tensorflow, with the allocation
mechanism shown here.
3The propagation of a resource mocks the flow of the brain-derived neurotrophic factor
(BDNF). [12]
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2.6 Running the network
The steps to run a network participant are:
1 Participant defines its dataset Di, loss Li and parameterized function fi
2 At each training iteration the participant broadcasts batches of examples
from Di to its peers [batch size, x]
3 Responses F (x) from the network produce a loss-gradient ∂L∂F which back-
propagates through fi and out to the network.
4 During 2 and 3 the participant competitively selects the weights for their
row wij ∈W .
5 Participants submit changes to the weights ∆Wi which, in-turn changes
the ranking and induces inflation τ ∗R.
6 Participants disconnect and verify the model in a normal manner.
Peers only communicate with computers that hold stake as a consequence
of section 2.5. Those that fail to produce value will be pruned naturally as
participants learn to differentiate signal from noise.
2.7 Conditional computation
As the network grows, outward bandwidth will become the major bottleneck.
Components learn to trim outward bandwidth by employing a Sparsely-Gated
Mixture-of-Experts (SGMoE) [13] layer at the input. The gating layer deter-
mines a sparse combination of children to query for each example and then
re-joins them using the the gating weights gj(x). The combined gated inputs
are fed as input to the local function:
fi = fi(G(x)) (9)
G(x) = [..., gj(x) ∗ fj(x), ...] (10)
The layer cuts outward bandwidth, querying only a small subset of peers for
each example. The gating function is trainable w.r.t to the loss and its weights
act as a proxy for importance wij ∈ W . This method has been shown to dras-
tically increase the potential for outward bandwidth in datacenter training,[13]
and has been investigated in a peer-to-peer (P2P) setting as well [5]
2.8 Extracting knowledge
Inter-node dependence in the network is broken using distillation[6], a com-
pression and knowledge technique in which a smaller model – the student -
mimics the behaviour of an ensemble. We employ this technique over the gat-
ing ensemble (10) where the student model learns to minimize the cross-entropy
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(shown below as KL) between the logits produced by the gating network and
its predicted distribution. [14]
distillation loss = KLD(dist(x), G(x)) (11)
We use the distilled model as proxy to cut recursive calling between each
components rather than query farther into the network. If models go offline,
their peers can use their distilled versions in-place. Private data can be val-
idated over the distilled models instead of querying the network. Eventually,
components can fully disconnect from the network using the distilled inputs to
validate and inference the models offline.
fjfk fi
distk
D
Li
Figure 3: Queries propagate to depth=1 before the distilled model is used.
3 Analysis
We consider the scenario where participants are not honestly reporting the sig-
nificance of their peers. The network is progressing at discrete timesteps t and
it is reasonable to assume that each participant is attempting to maximize their
subjective payoff over these steps.
3.1 Payoff Model
The staking system in Section 2.4 gives participants incentive to maximize their
self-weight wii while the competitive connectivity described in Section 2.5 makes
it costly for participants to decrease the remaining weights wij in their row.
Since the row must sum to 1, we have a trade-off in two terms: (1) a utility
term attached to the loss U(L(W )) and (2) the token emission via inflation
τ ∗ Ri(W ). Both of these are functions of the weights and, without loss of
generality, measured in similar units:
Pi(W ) = Ui(Li(W )) + τ ∗R(W )i (12)
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It is reasonable to assume payoff maximizing participants will use Pi as their
objective during training. This can be computed using standard tools since both
terms U(Li(W )) and R(W )i are fully continuous and differentiable. The system
can be characterized as a competitive gradient descent game where participants
are making steps ∆Wi =
∂Pi
∂Wi
. In appendix 6.2 we prove that this strategy is
regret-free and achieves the best expected payoff in hindsight. This assumption
is also generally employed in smooth markets [15]. The iterative descent thus
follows:
W t+1 = W t + λ∆W (13)
∆W = [
∂P0
∂W0
; ...;
∂Pn
∂Wn
] (14)
3.2 Empirical Model
Without access to the running network we evaluate our system using an empiri-
cal model. To derive the gradient steps in this model ∂Pi∂Wi we make the following
assumptions: (1) the utility functions are continuous-differentiable and can be
approximated by their first order derivatives ∂U∂L = α and (2) the network is
converged to a local minimum in the inputs ∂L∂F = 0. The first assumption is
approximate for small changes of continuous functions and the second assump-
tion is realistic after extended training. In Appendix 6.2 we derive the following
gradient step:
∂P
∂W
=
α
τ
∗ ∂L
∂W
+
∂R
∂W
(15)
∂L
∂W
=
∂
∂W
[(FW − FW0)T ∗H(L(F )) ∗ (FW − FW0)] (16)
Here FW is the masked inputs from Section 2.5. (FW −FW0) is the difference
in the mask between the choice of weights W and the weights at the minimum
W0 and H(L(F )) is the [n×n] hessian of the loss over inputs F . This formulation
is both (1) intuitive: the gradient term ∂L∂W measures the change in loss for
any choice of weights, and (2) useful: it allows us to compute the ranking for
simulated hessian terms.
The remainder of the network is deterministic, and can be described by a
choice of θ = [α, τ, λ, n, σ, T, S,W,H]. For instance, the secondary term, ∂R∂W can
be computed-directly from Section 2.4 and only depends on the stake vector S
and weights W .
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• n: The number of nodes e.g. n=100.
• α: The first order utility derivative ∂U∂L = α.
• τ : The block-inflation rate: St+1 = St + τ ∗R.
• λ: The weight matrix learning rate: W t+1 = W t + λ∆W .
• σ, T : The activation function and temperature: σ = 1
1+e−
x
T
• S: The stake vector [1× n]
• W0: A initial weight matrix [n× n]
• H(L(F ))i: For each fi, the hessian of the loss Li over inputs F (x) n×[n×n]
3.3 Experiments
To generate sample statistics from the network, we first select [α, τ, λ, S, σ, T, n] ∈
θ, then we generate random positive semi-definite hessians H, and random uni-
form initial weights W0. For each parameterization we discover the competitive
ranking by converging the system to a Nash-equilibrium: an equilibrium where
no individual can vary from their set of weights and stand to gain. [16] To
find these equilibrium, we use competitive descent strategy described in (14)
and compute the gradient terms from (15). In each trial we use a learning rate
λ = 0.005 and stop when the gradient terms are bounded by  or the steps
exceed 1000×n. The competitive ranking R∗ at this point follows from (4) and
can be compared to the idealized score in R from (2).
We are interested in the correlation between R∗ and R as we vary the ratio
α and τ , this ratio is explicit in (15) where the fraction relates the two gradient
terms. Intuitively the ratio is between the value of minimizing the loss and
maximizing revenue from inflation. Since this effects the ranking, we show this
trade-off for various choices in Figure 4.
Finally, in Figure-5 we implement an adaptive-τ strategy where the network
varies the inflation rate. Initial inflation is zero and then increases until the
weights begins to converge towards the main diagonal wii = 1. We measure the
sparsity sparsity = sum(Wdg)/sum(W ), the ratio between the main diagonal
and the remaining weights. As sparsity increases we push the market equilibrium
by decreasing τ . Figure shows this adaptive convergence for α = 1 with a
sparsity target of 1.
4 Discussion
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the idealized rank and the competitive
rank as a function of ατ . Figure-4-a,
α
τ = 1 shows the case where this ratio
negatively effects the ranking accuracy. Here, all components have set wii = 1
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Figure 4: Correlations between the competitive rank and coordinated rank for
α
τ ∈ {1, 10, 25, 50}. For low values of ατ the weights converge to the identity:
the state where peers are fully disconnected.
and the resulting scores for all participants has converged to 1/n. When this
occurs, the system could decrease the inflation rate τ and push the network
towards the high information markets seen in Figure-4-b, 4-c, & 4-d. Figure-5
shows a basic implementation of this where τ adapts to the ratio between the
row-sums and the main-diagonal. By lowering inflation, it subsequently ’costs
less’ to connect with peers. Profit maximizing nodes automatically adjust to
the change and the system converges back towards an accurate ranking. Those
with high ranks will oppose inflation decreased, while those with low ranks will
welcome it. The equilibrium found in this meta game will most certainly depend
on the number of participants, key to both the ranking accuracy and the market
at its core. However, we leave this analysis for a follow up paper.
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Figure 5: (i) Left: the ratio between the main diagonal and the remainder
of the weights. Right: the adaptive τ parameter converging onto the target.
The weight matrix sparsity is a proxy for the ranking accuracy which we see in
Figure 4. As sparsity converges onto the target the ranking is also improving.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed an inter-model benchmark that can run in a P2P setting
outside of a trusted environment. We started with a typical machine learning
framework defined by a set of functions with their losses over given datasets,
then derived an idealized ranking score. The measure produced an information
theoretic score that new participants can improve by learning how to be useful
to their peers. However, the system is incomplete without a mechanism that
prevents participants from ranking dishonestly. To resolve this, we proposed an
incentive scheme and a differential allocation system over the network weights.
The system allows the participants to train for connectivity in the graph. Fol-
lowing this, we described how to increase the outward bandwidth in the system
using a trainable gating network and how to cut independence between nodes
using distillation. Finally we showed how increasing the number of nodes in the
system and fixing the inflation mechanism properly ensured that the resulting
rank scores would correlate with those found in a idealized setting. While this
is true, stake in the system holds value as a means to drive what the network
learns. That benchmark is continually being solved by the participants, com-
pounding what has been learned before and making it available to new learners
in the system.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Deriving the idealized ranking.
We approximate the change in the benchmark ∆B at a local minimum under a
perturbation ∆F (x)i = [...,−fi(x), ...] reflecting the removal of the ith node.
∆B = B(F + ∆Fi)− B(F ) =
n∑
i
Li(F + ∆Fi)− Li(F ) (17)
Li(F + ∆Fi)− Li(F ) ≈ ∂Li
∂F
∗∆Fi + 1
2
∆FTi ∗H(Li) ∗∆Fi +O(∆F 3i ) (18)
(17) follows from the definition of the benchmark B and (18) follows from
a Taylor series under the perturbation ∆F (x)i. Note that the first term
∂Li
∂F is
zero at the local minimum and the higher order term O(∆F 3i ) can be ignored
for sufficiently small perturbations. These assumptions are also made by [10]
and [11]. Note that Li is an expectation over the dataset Di, and all terms are
evaluated at a point x so we have:
∆B ≈
n∑
i
∑
x∈Di
∆FTi (x) ∗H(Qi(x)) ∗∆Fi(x) (19)
Here the hessian over the error function H(Qi(x)) and the summation over
the dataset
∑
x∈Di have been appropriately substituted. The constant factor
1
2
can be removed and this leaves our result.
6.2 Deriving the weight convergence game.
6.3 Theorem
For choice of Hessians H(L(F )) the network convergence-game can be described
with the following linear relationship between gradient terms:
∂P
∂W
=
α
τ
∗ ∂L
∂W
+
∂R
∂W
(20)
With the gradient of the loss:
∂L
∂W
=
∂
∂W
[(FW − FW0)T ∗H(L(F )) ∗ (FW − FW0)] (21)
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6.4 Setup
We analyze the system by characterizing the behaviour of participants via their
payoff in two terms (1) the utility attached to that participant’s loss as a function
of their weights U(L(W )). U is assumed roughly linear for small change in the
weight matrix, U(L) = α ∗ L, and ∂U∂L = α and (2) the network is converged to
a local minimum in the inputs ∂L∂F = 0. From the payoff formulation in 6.3 we
write:
P (W ) = α ∗ L(W ) + τ ∗R(W ) (22)
Note, the utility function and emission were measured in similar units and
so α is the price of each unit change in loss. The analysis just supposes such
a score exists, not that it can be computed. Participants are selecting their
weights by making gradient steps ∆Wi =
∂Pi
∂Wi
= ∂Ui∂Wi + τ ∗ ∂Ri∂Wi as to maximize
their local payoff. For brevity we omit the subscript i for the remainder of the
analysis. Consider a Taylor expansion of the loss under a change ∆F in the
inputs.
L(F + ∆F ) = L(F ) + ∂L
∂F
∆F +
1
2
∆F ∗H(L(F )) ∗∆F +O(∆F 3) (23)
The first linear term ∂L∂F is zero and the higher order terms are removed for
sufficiently small perturbations in F . We then perform a change of variable
F = FW0 , and ∆F = FW1 −FW0 where is W0 are the current set of weights and
W1 are another choice such that FW0 and FW1 are those inputs masked by W0
and W1 according to (7). Substituting this into (23):
L(FW1) = L(FW0)) +
1
2
(FW1 − FW0)T ∗H(L(F )) ∗ (FW1 − FW0) (24)
The function L(FW1) is simply an approximation of the loss for any choice
of weights W1 given that the network has converged under W0. Finally, by the
α-linear assumption of the utility we can attain the following:
∂U
∂W
= α ∗ ∂L
∂W
= α
∂
∂W
[(FW − FW0)T ∗H(L(F )) ∗ (FW − FW0)] (25)
Note that we’ve dropped the subscript W1, L(FW0)) is constant not de-
pending on the choice of weights, and the fraction 12 has been removed. The
remaining term ∂R∂W is derivable via the ranking ranking function in Section 2.3.
Finally, dividing both terms by τ shows the result:
∂P
∂W
≈ α
τ
∗ ∂L
∂W
+
∂R
∂W
(26)
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∂L
∂W
=
∂
∂W
[(FW − FW0)T ∗H(L(F )) ∗ (FW − FW0)] (27)
6.5 Deriving the ex-post zero-regret step.
Consider the system described above. A set of n nodes are changing the weights
in the ranking matrix W iteratively using gradient descent with learning rate
λ. W t+1 = W t + λ∆W . Here, the change of weights is ∆W = [∆w0, ...,∆wn]
where each ∆wi is the weight change pushed by node i. Each node is attempting
to competitively maximize it’s payoff as a function of the weights Pi(W ).
6.5.1 Definition
The ex-post regret for a single step is the maximum difference in loss between
the chosen step ∆wi and all alternative ∆w
∗
i . The expected ex-post regret is
this difference in expectation, where the expectation is taken over all choices
∆wj ’s chosen by other participants [16].
rgti = E∆wj [max
∆w∗i
[Pi(∆w
∗
i )− Pi(∆wi)]] (28)
6.5.2 Theorem
For sufficiently small λ, the expected ex-post regret for strategy ∆wi =
∂P
∂wi
is
0.
6.5.3 Proof
Consider Taylor’s theorem at the point W for the payoff function P under a
change in weights W ∗ = W + λ∆W . There exists a function h(W ∗) such that
in the limit as, W ∗ →W we have the exact equivalence:
P (W ∗) = P (W ) +
∂P
∂W
(W ∗ −W ) + h(W ∗) (29)
Let P (W∗) represent the payoff when the weight change of the ith row is
∆Wi =
∂P
∂Wi
, and let P (W ∗) be any other choice. By the definition of regret,
and Taylors theorem as λ→ 0, we have:
rgti = E∆Wj [max
∆W∗i
[
∂P
∂W
(W ∗ −W )− ∂P
∂W
(W∗ −W )]] (30)
This follows by subtracting (29) with choice W ∗ and W∗. Next, substituting
W ∗ −W = −λ∆W and expanding ∂P∂W ∆W = [ ∂P∂W0 ∗∆W0, ... ∂P∂Wn ∗∆Wn] into
the equation above leaves:
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∂P
∂W
(W ∗ −W )− ∂P
∂W
(W∗ −W ) = λ( ∂P
∂Wi
∗∆W ∗i −
∂P
∂Wi
∗∆Wi∗)+
λ
n∑
j 6=i
(
∂P
∂Wj
∗∆W ∗j +
∂P
∂Wj
∗∆Wj∗)
(31)
The constant λ can be removed and the second term depends only on weights
of other rows Wj 6=i. These can be removed under the expectation E∆Wj . He
have:
rgti = E∆Wj [max
∆W∗i
[
∂P
∂Wi
∗∆W ∗i −
∂P
∂Wi
∗∆Wi∗]] (32)
Finally, we use the the fact that for vectors a, b and angle between them θ the
magnitude of the dot product is |a||b|cosθ. This is maximized when the vectors
are parallel θ = 0 and cos(θ) = 1, or ∆Wi = κ ∗ ∂P∂Wi for some constant κ > 0.
Thus P (∆W ∗) is maximize when ∆W ∗i = κ ∗ ∂P∂Wi . Since P (∆W ∗) = P (∆W∗)
in the maximum, this proves the point.
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